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INTRODUCTION 
he significant increase in multi-forum litigation of intra-corporate 
disputes over the last decade has imposed considerable monetary 
costs on stockholders and raised uncertainty in outcomes.1 Forum 
selection bylaws, unilaterally adopted by corporate boards of directors 
and generally restricting the forum for intra-corporate lawsuits to the 
state of incorporation, have emerged as a popular solution to this 
costly problem.2 In 2013 and early 2014, courts both inside and 
outside of Delaware rendered favorable decisions for corporations on 
these bylaws, signaling general acceptance of their validity and 
enforceability.3 However, an Oregon court’s contrary decision has 
thrown this general acceptance into question. 
In August 2014, an Oregon circuit court held in Roberts v. TriQuint 
Semiconductor, Inc. (TriQuint) that a forum selection bylaw, 
unilaterally adopted by a corporate board of directors and without the 
vote of the corporation’s stockholders, was unenforceable under 
Delaware law.4 This holding appears to directly conflict with the 
 
1 Joseph A. Grundfest & Kristen A. Savelle, The Brouhaha over Intra-Corporate 
Forum Selection Provisions: A Legal, Economic, and Political Analysis, 68 BUS. LAW. 
325, 328–29, 333 (2013). 
2 Alison Frankel, New Data Suggests Corporate Forum-Selection Bylaws Are Working, 
WESTLAW J. DEL. CORP., Mar. 2, 2015, at *1, 29 No. 17 WJDEC 11. 
3 Victor Lewkow, Forum Selection Clauses in the “Foreign” Court, HARV. L. SCH. F. 
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 29, 2014), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu 
/2014/03/29/forum-selection-clauses-in-the-foreign-court/. 
4 Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., No. 1402-02441, 2014 WL 4147465, at *5 
(Or. Cir. Ct. Aug. 14, 2014). 
T
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Delaware Court of Chancery’s 2013 decision in Boilermakers Local 
154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp. (Chevron). In Chevron, the 
court held that forum selection bylaws are valid and enforceable 
contract provisions under Delaware law.5 Since the Chevron decision, 
multiple courts in jurisdictions outside of Delaware have also 
considered the validity and enforceability of forum selection bylaws 
and the reasoning provided in Chevron. Unlike TriQuint, however, all 
of these courts have upheld the bylaws as enforceable provisions.6 
TriQuint has shaken the previous unanimity in foreign courts’ 
application of the Chevron decision. Although not expressly 
contradicting Chevron, the TriQuint court found a forum selection 
bylaw to be unenforceable as-applied for public policy reasons.7 
However, strong policy considerations weigh against the TriQuint 
court’s decision. Instead, Oregon courts and courts in all other 
jurisdictions should enforce forum selection bylaws for policy 
considerations of consistency, efficiency, and judicial expertise. 
Furthermore, based on the outcome in TriQuint, corporations 
looking to prevent multi-forum intra-corporate litigation may have 
more difficulty enforcing their forum selection bylaws in Oregon, as 
well as in states that have not yet evaluated a forum selection bylaw. 
Therefore, corporations should consider additional factors when 
adopting forum selection bylaws. A corporation that has not yet 
adopted a forum selection provision should adopt its bylaw on a 
“clear day”—before the corporation is engaged in activity that will 
likely result in an intra-corporate lawsuit—to increase the likelihood 
the bylaw will be enforced. If a corporation has already adopted a 
forum selection bylaw, but did not do so on a clear day, and has had 
an intra-corporate claim brought against it outside of its selected 
forum, the corporation should first file a motion to dismiss in the 
forum hearing the action.8 If that motion is denied, the corporation 
may still be able to halt the action in the other forum through an anti-
suit injunction in the Delaware Court of Chancery. 
 
5 Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 963 (Del. Ch. 
2013). 
6 E.g., North v. McNamara, 47 F. Supp. 3d 635, 647 (S.D. Ohio 2014); Groen v. 
Safeway Inc., No. RG14716641, 2014 WL 3405752, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 14, 2014).  
7 TriQuint, 2014 WL 4147465, at *5. 
8 Transcript of Telephonic Hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for Expedited Proceedings and 
for Temporary Restraining Order and Rulings of the Court at 36–37, Edgen Group Inc. v. 
Genoud, No. 9055-VCL, 2013 WL 6409517 (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 2013) [hereinafter 
Transcript of Hearing for Temporary Restraining Order]. 
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Part I of this Note introduces the relevant background, briefly 
summarizing the emergence of forum selection bylaws, pre-Chevron 
treatment of forum selection clauses and bylaws, and relevant 
precedents in Oregon contract law and Delaware corporate law. Part 
II discusses the Chevron decision in more detail, looking at the 
Delaware Court of Chancery’s discussion of the validity and 
enforceability of forum selection bylaws. This Part also explores how 
other courts outside of Delaware have treated the Chevron decision, 
focusing on Groen v. Safeway Inc.9 and North v. McNamara.10 Part 
III examines the facts and reasoning of the TriQuint decision and its 
aftermath in the Oregon Supreme Court. Part IV offers a critique of 
the TriQuint decision, presenting legal and policy reasons why the 
court should have enforced the bylaw. This Part compares TriQuint’s 
discussion of Chevron to that of the Groen and North courts, looking 
to Oregon contract law to explain the difference. Additionally, it 
explains why the policy considerations of consistency, efficiency, and 
judicial expertise weigh in favor of enforcing forum selection bylaws 
and against the holding reached in TriQuint. Part V concludes by 
exploring the implications of the TriQuint decision for forum 
selection bylaw challenges in light of TriQuint’s writ of mandamus 
petition pending before the Oregon Supreme Court. It also provides 
recommendations for how corporations can increase the likelihood 
that courts outside of Delaware will enforce their forum selection 
bylaws. 
I 
THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF FORUM SELECTION 
BYLAWS 
Forum selection bylaws developed as a corporate response to the 
upsurge in multi-forum litigation during the 2000s and the costs 
associated with such litigation.11 However, the emergence of these 
bylaws was met with some speculation from legal scholars regarding 
the bylaws’ enforceability.12 Relevant background for a discussion of 
 
9 Groen, 2014 WL 3405752. 
10 North, 47 F. Supp. 3d 635. 
11 Dominick T. Gattuso & Meghan A. Adams, Delaware Insider: Forum Selection 
Provisions in Corporate Charters and Bylaws: Validity vs. Enforceability, BUS. L. TODAY, 
Dec. 2013, at 1, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2013/12/delaware_insider 
.html. 
12 See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas, What Should We Do About Multijurisdictional 
Litigation in M&A Deals?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1925, 1952–53 (2013). 
VINCENT (DO NOT DELETE) 12/17/2015  1:35 PM 
2015] The Implications of Oregon’s TriQuint Decision for Enforcing 227 
Forum Selection Bylaws 
bylaw enforceability with respect to the TriQuint decision includes 
treatment of forum selection clauses and bylaws prior to the Chevron 
decision, Oregon contract law, and Delaware corporate law. 
A. Multi-forum Litigation and the Emergence of Forum Selection 
Bylaws 
The increased prevalence of multi-forum litigation in intra-
corporate disputes of publicly traded corporations is a relatively new 
development.13 Historically, most intra-corporate lawsuits were 
brought in the state of incorporation, typically Delaware.14 Parties 
preferred to litigate disputes in Delaware because of a perceived 
“comparative advantage both in the resolution of complex business 
disputes and in the interpretation of Delaware law.”15 Over the last 
ten years, however, plaintiff-stockholders have increasingly brought 
additional suits in other fora,16 resulting in multi-forum litigation of 
identical or nearly identical claims.17 This trend is particularly 
prominent in stockholder challenges to corporate mergers, where, in 
2011, more than “90 percent of merger transactions were challenged 
by stockholders,”18 and each transaction faced an average of six 
lawsuits.19 Some scholars and practitioners have speculated that this 
increase in multi-forum litigation has been incentivized by the 
economic advantage it provides plaintiffs’ counsel.20 For example, 
most merger challenges result in settlements where “[c]ompanies 
typically agree to pay plaintiffs’ lawyers fees,” averaging $1.2 
 
13 Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 1, at 334. 
14 Id.; Holly J. Gregory, The Elusive Promise of Reducing Shareholder Litigation 
Through Corporate Bylaws, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 
9, 2014), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/06/09/the-elusive-promise-of-reducing         
-shareholder-litigation-through-corporate-bylaws/. 
15 Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 1, at 334. 
16 Id.; Thomas, supra note 12, at 1927. 
17 Michael O’Bryan, Exclusive Forum Provisions: A New Item for Corporate 
Governance and M&A Checklists, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. 
(July 14, 2014), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/07/14/exclusive-forum-provisions-a  
-new-item-for-corporate-governance-and-ma-checklists/. 
18 Gattuso & Adams, supra note 11, at 1. 
19 Robert M. Daines & Olga Koumrian, Merger Lawsuits Yield High Costs and 
Questionable Benefits, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 8, 2012, 10:38 AM), http://dealbook 
.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/merger-lawsuits-yield-high-costs-and-questionable-benefits 
/?_r=0. 
20 See, e.g., Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 1, at 333; Gregory, supra note 14. Further 
discussion of the causes of the increase in multi-forum litigation is beyond the scope of 
this Note. 
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million.21 Whatever the reason, having to defend identical or similar 
lawsuits in multiple fora has resulted in significant increases in time 
and money devoted by corporations to litigating intra-corporate 
claims,22 ultimately harming the stockholders collectively.23 
In response to the rise in multi-forum litigation, corporations began 
to add forum selection provisions to their bylaws.24 Commentators 
speculate this increase is the result of dicta from In re Revlon, Inc. 
Shareholders Litigation,25 a Delaware Court of Chancery decision 
where Vice Chancellor Laster expressed support for corporations’ 
power to adopt forum selection provisions, potentially as bylaws.26 
The possible use of bylaws to add forum selection provisions 
provided a key tool to corporations concerned with exposure to multi-
forum litigation: it allowed corporate boards of directors to 
unilaterally adopt forum selection provisions.27 The increase in forum 
selection bylaws has been met with controversy over the validity and 
enforceability of these provisions.28 
B. Pre-Chevron Treatment of Forum Selection Clauses and Bylaws 
The Chevron court was not the first to rule on the enforceability of 
forum selection bylaws; rather, the original challenge was heard in 
Galaviz v. Berg in 2011.29 In Galaviz, the District Court for the 
Northern District of California addressed the contractual 
enforceability of a forum selection bylaw unilaterally adopted by a 
corporate board of directors.30 The defendant Delaware corporation 
adopted the bylaw “after the alleged wrongdoing took place.”31 When 
the stockholders filed an intra-corporate claim in the Northern District 
 
21 Daines & Koumrian, supra note 19. 
22 O’Bryan, supra note 17. 
23 Daines & Koumrian, supra note 19. 
24 O’Bryan, supra note 17. 
25 E.g., Gattuso & Adams, supra note 11, at 1. The Delaware Court of Chancery often 
uses dicta to guide corporate parties on unresolved legal issues. Mohsen Manesh, Damning 
Dictum: The Default Duty Debate in Delaware, 39 J. CORP. L. 35, 54 (2013). 
26 In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“[I]f boards 
of directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and 
value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond with 
charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”). 
27 See Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 1, at 370. 
28 Id. at 326. 
29 Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
30 Id. at 1171. 
31 Id. 
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of California, the corporation moved to dismiss pursuant to the 
bylaw’s forum designation.32 The court denied the motion,33 finding 
that, at least for the stockholders who purchased stock before the 
bylaw was adopted, “there [was] no element of mutual consent to the 
forum choice at all.”34 The court found the corporate board’s 
unilateral adoption of the forum selection bylaw determinative.35 
While federal law generally favored enforcement of forum selection 
clauses, courts were simply “giv[ing] effect to a bilateral agreement 
between the parties” in those circumstances.36 Because the bylaw at 
issue was unilaterally adopted by the board of directors without 
stockholders’ consent, “there [was] no basis for the [c]ourt to 
disregard the plaintiffs’ choice of forum.”37 
An earlier United States Supreme Court case, Bremen v. Zapata 
Off-Shore Co.,38 provided relevant context for the Galaviz court’s 
forum selection bylaw analysis.39 Prior to the emergence of forum 
selection bylaws, the Court in Bremen established a test for the as-
applied enforceability40 of forum selection clauses.41 The Court was 
presented with a forum selection clause included in a contract 
between two corporations.42 While American courts had not 
historically favored forum selection clauses,43 the Court found that a 
forum selection clause “made in an arm’s-length negotiation by 
experienced and sophisticated businessmen, and absent some 
compelling and countervailing reason . . . should be honored by the 
parties and enforced by the courts.”44 To determine whether a 
compelling and countervailing reason existed, the Court established 
the following test: a forum selection clause is enforceable unless (1) 
 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 1175. 
34 Id. at 1171. 
35 See id. at 1174. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
39 See Galaviz, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 1172–73. 
40 For the purposes of this Note, “as-applied enforceability” concerns whether a court 
would enforce the bylaw in an as-applied challenge, based on the specific facts and 
circumstances surrounding the bylaw adoption and the intra-corporate claim. See As-
Applied Challenge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
41 See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15. 
42 Id. at 2–3. 
43 Id. at 9. 
44 Id. at 12. 
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“enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust,”45 (2) “the clause 
[is] invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching,”46 or (3) 
“enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in 
which the suit is brought.”47 Because the forum selection clause at 
issue was freely negotiated and any inconvenience from enforcement 
of the clause “was clearly foreseeable at the time of contracting,” the 
Court held that the clause was enforceable.48 Forty years later, the 
Bremen doctrine would emerge as a key test for as-applied 
enforceability in forum selection bylaw challenges.49 
C. Oregon Contract Law 
Like the United States Supreme Court in Bremen, Oregon state 
courts also generally enforce forum selection clauses.50 In Reeves v. 
Chem Industrial Co., the Oregon Supreme Court first recognized the 
enforceability of forum selection clauses.51 Prior to Reeves, forum 
selection clauses were considered void under Oregon contract law 
because the stipulation of an exclusive forum violated Oregon public 
policy.52 However, the national trend in courts’ treatment of forum 
selection clauses was changing.53 The Oregon Supreme Court found 
the change persuasive and held that forum selection clauses are 
presumptively enforceable.54 Nonetheless, the court still needed to 
reconcile its decision with existing Oregon precedents.55 The court 
refused to overrule State ex rel. Kahn v. Tazwell, the leading Oregon 
precedent against forum selection clauses.56 Instead, the court 
distinguished the clause in Reeves from the clause in Tazwell, 
reasoning that the Tazwell clause was held to be unenforceable 
because it was unfair and unreasonable.57 In distinguishing Reeves 
 
45 Id. at 15. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. Hereinafter, this test will be referred to as the “Bremen doctrine.” 
48 Id. at 17–18. 
49 See, e.g., Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 959 
(Del. Ch. 2013); Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., No. 1402-02441, 2014 WL 
4147465, at *3 (Or. Cir. Ct. Aug. 14, 2014). 
50 Nike USA, Inc. v. Pro Sports Wear, Inc., 145 P.3d 321, 324 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). 
51 Reeves v. Chem Indus. Co., 495 P.2d 729, 730 (Or. 1972). 
52 Id. (citing State ex rel. Kahn v. Tazwell, 266 P. 238, 243 (Or. 1928)). 
53 Id. at 730–31 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 80 (1969)). 
54 Id. at 732. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
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from Tazwell, the court clarified the meaning of unfair or 
unreasonable: if the forum selection clause (1) is contained in a 
contract of adhesion and (2) “[is] the product of unequal bargaining 
power,” then the clause is unfair and unreasonable under Oregon 
contract law.58 Forum selection clauses offered on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis are included in this category and, consequently, are 
unenforceable under Reeves.59 
Since Reeves, Oregon courts have elaborated on the meaning of 
“unfair or unreasonable” when enforcing forum selection clauses. In 
Colonial Leasing Co. v. McIlroy, the Oregon Court of Appeals held 
that a forum selection clause was enforceable, even though it was 
included in the boilerplate conditions provided on the back of a one-
page equipment lease.60 The front page contained the signature line 
and directed the lessee to consult the other side for additional terms 
and conditions.61 The court enforced the clause, after determining it 
was not offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.62 The court reasoned 
that the unfairness and unreasonableness determinations “must be 
made in the light of the evidence and the facts of particular cases.”63 
Highly relevant to the court was the opportunity the lessee had 
voluntarily foregone to negotiate the forum selection clause.64 
Conversely, in Nike USA, Inc. v. Pro Sports Wear, Inc., the Oregon 
Court of Appeals affirmed the unenforceability of a similarly placed 
forum selection clause when the opposing party never signed the 
document containing that clause.65 The defendant had purchased 
goods “for which invoices containing an Oregon forum selection 
clause were sent,” but the defendant did not sign any of those invoices 
and the credit agreement that the defendant did sign did not contain a 
forum selection clause.66 The court affirmed the unenforceability of 
the clause after it found the record supported the lower court’s finding 
of insufficient evidence to show the parties’ intent to include a forum 
 
58 Id. (quoting in part Willis L. M. Reese, The Contractual Forum: Situation in the 
United States, 13 AM. J. COMP. L. 187, 188 (1964)). 
59 Id. 
60 Colonial Leasing Co. v. McIlroy, 765 P.2d 219, 220 (Or. Ct. App. 1988). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 221. 
63 Id. 
64 See id. 
65 Nike USA, Inc. v. Pro Sports Wear, Inc., 145 P.3d 321, 325 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). 
66 Id. at 324. 
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selection clause by effectively modifying the credit agreement 
through the unsigned invoices.67 
Together, Reeves, Colonial Leasing, and Nike USA represent the 
current approach to forum selection clauses in Oregon. Forum 
selection clauses are treated as prima facie valid,68 but courts will not 
enforce a clause if the evidence proves the clause is unfair or 
unreasonable.69 A take-it-or-leave-it provision offered in a contract of 
adhesion is presumptively unfair and unreasonable.70 However, 
boilerplate conditions may be enforceable if an opportunity to 
negotiate the clause existed.71 Based on these cases, Oregon contract 
law supports the enforcement of forum selection clauses, but only to 
the extent the clause is supported by evidence of an opportunity to 
negotiate the term or of mutual intent to add the term. 
D. Delaware Corporate Law 
To understand the impact of the Chevron decision, it is necessary 
to first comprehend the weight given to Delaware corporate law 
outside of Delaware. Under the internal affairs doctrine, courts 
outside of the state of incorporation must apply the substantive law of 
the state of incorporation to intra-corporate claims.72 Because the 
forum selection bylaws in question only apply to intra-corporate 
disputes, bylaw challenges are subject to the internal affairs 
doctrine.73 Therefore, Delaware law on bylaw validity and 
enforceability is binding upon other courts when deciding intra-
corporate lawsuits involving Delaware corporations.74 
Delaware statutory corporate law shapes the contractual framework 
between corporations and stockholders. The framework for Delaware 
corporations to adopt, modify, and delete bylaws is provided by title 
8, section 109 of the Delaware General Corporate Law (DGCL).75 
Under DGCL section 109, bylaws may be “adopted, amended or 
 
67 Id. at 324–25. 
68 Id. at 324. 
69 Reeves v. Chem Indus. Co., 495 P.2d 729, 732 (Or. 1972). 
70 Id. 
71 See Colonial Leasing Co. v. McIlroy, 765 P.2d 219, 221 (Or. Ct. App. 1988). 
72 36 AM. JUR. 2D Foreign Corporations § 72 (2015); see also Thomas, supra note 12, 
at 1926–27. 
73 See Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 1, at 330. 
74 Cf. Thomas, supra note 12, at 1927 (discussing multijurisdictional litigation of M&A 
deals under the internal affairs doctrine). 
75 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2014). 
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repealed” by a corporation’s board of directors prior to the sale of 
stock.76 Once stock has been sold and payment received, however, 
that power shifts to voting stockholders.77 Nonetheless, section 109(a) 
provides an important exception: 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, any corporation may, in its 
certificate of incorporation, confer the power to adopt, amend or 
repeal bylaws upon the directors or, in the case of a nonstock 
corporation, upon its governing body. The fact that such power has 
been so conferred upon the directors or governing body, as the case 
may be, shall not divest the stockholders or members of the power, 
nor limit their power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws.78 
Therefore, Delaware corporations may confer upon their boards of 
directors the power to unilaterally adopt bylaws, but voting 
stockholders still retain the concurrent power to amend or repeal those 
bylaws.79 The scope of these bylaws extends to “the business of the 
corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the 
rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or 
employees.”80 DGCL section 109 is implicated heavily in the validity 
of forum selection bylaws because of the power and subject matter at 
issue. It also plays a role in determining whether there is mutual 
assent upon which to enforce such clauses.81 
Delaware corporate law also recognizes situations where bylaws 
unilaterally adopted under section 109 are unenforceable. In Schnell 
v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court provided 
a limit to the enforcement of unilaterally adopted bylaws when 
enacted through “fraud or inequitable conduct.”82 At issue in Schnell 
was the directors’ decision to hold the annual stockholders’ meeting 
thirty-four days earlier than the date set by the bylaws.83 The change 
was made through a bylaw amendment executed unilaterally by the 
directors less than two months prior to the new stockholders’ meeting 
date.84 The amendment was allegedly a response to stockholders’ 
 
76 Id. § 109(a). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. § 109(b). 
81 See infra Part II.A for discussion of the facial enforceability of forum selection 
bylaws. 
82 Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971). 
83 Id. at 438. 
84 Id. at 438–39 (quoting the lower court’s decision, 285 A.2d 430, 434 (Del. Ch. 
1971)). 
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express hostility toward the directors.85 The court found that the 
board “ha[d] attempted to utilize the corporate machinery and the 
Delaware Law for the purpose of perpetuating itself in office; and . . . 
for the purpose of obstructing the legitimate efforts of dissident 
stockholders in the exercise of their rights.”86 Consequently, the court 
held that the use of Delaware law for such “inequitable purposes, 
contrary to [the] established principles of corporate democracy . . . 
may not be permitted to stand.”87 While the change was within the 
scope of the directors’ powers to amend bylaws under the DGCL, the 
court clarified that “inequitable action does not become permissible 
simply because it is legally possible.”88 However, the court was 
careful to note that, absent evidence of “fraud or inequitable conduct,” 
the bylaw amendment would have been enforced.89 
II 
THE CHEVRON DECISION 
Until recently, only one court had considered the enforceability of 
a unilaterally adopted forum selection bylaw; that court refused to 
enforce the bylaw.90 In 2013, however, the Delaware Court of 
Chancery rendered the first decision enforcing a unilaterally adopted 
forum selection bylaw.91 This decision has profoundly impacted other 
jurisdictions, setting a binding precedent that has shifted the tide on 
judicial treatment of these bylaws.92 
A. The Delaware Court of Chancery’s Decision 
The case before the court in Chevron involved two corporate 
boards of directors that unilaterally passed forum selection bylaws.93 
Both were empowered to adopt bylaws by their corporations’ 
respective certificates of incorporation, pursuant to DGCL section 
109(a).94 The boards argued that they adopted the bylaws “to address 
 
85 See id. (quoting the lower court’s decision, 285 A.2d at 434). 
86 Id. at 439. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 See supra Part I.B for discussion of the Galaviz decision. 
91 Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch. 
2013). 
92 See infra Part II.C. 
93 Chevron, 73 A.3d at 937. 
94 Id. 
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what they perceive[d] to be the inefficient costs of defending against 
the same claim in multiple courts at one time.”95 Stockholders sued, 
alleging, among other claims, that the forum selection bylaws were 
contractually invalid because the corporations’ directors unilaterally 
adopted them.96 Therefore, the stockholders contended, the forum 
selection bylaws were unenforceable.97 In response, the corporations 
moved for a judgment on the pleadings.98 The court granted the 
motion,99 holding the bylaws were both valid and enforceable.100 
The court first considered the validity of the bylaws under 
Delaware corporate law.101 Beginning with an explanation of the 
flexible design of stockholder contracts under the DGCL, the court 
emphasized the corporations’ certificates of incorporation as the 
source of the power to add the bylaw.102 Focusing on DGCL section 
109, the court explained that “[t]he DGCL allows the corporation, 
through the certificate of incorporation, to grant the directors the 
power to adopt and amend the bylaws unilaterally.”103 Furthermore, 
the court found the forum selection bylaws’ subject matter was within 
the scope allowed under DGCL section 109(b), regulating “where 
stockholders can exercise their right to bring certain internal affairs 
claims” and “the conduct of the corporation by channeling internal 
affairs cases into the courts of the state of incorporation.”104 
Therefore, the court concluded that the bylaws at issue were within 
the scope of section 109 and statutorily valid under the DGCL.105 
The court next considered the facial enforceability106 of the 
unilaterally adopted forum selection bylaws as contract terms.107 The 
court began by noting that the Delaware Supreme Court had 
 
95 Id. at 943. 
96 Id. at 938. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 941. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 939. 
101 Id. at 950. 
102 Id. at 939. 
103 Id. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2012)). 
104 Id. at 951. 
105 Id. at 954. 
106 For the purposes of this Note, “facial enforceability” concerns whether a court 
would enforce the bylaw in a facial challenge without consideration of the specific facts 
and circumstances surrounding the bylaw adoption and the intra-corporate claim. See 
Facial Challenge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 40. 
107 Chevron, 73 A.3d at 954. 
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consistently “made clear that the bylaws constitute a binding part of 
the contract between a Delaware corporation and its stockholders.”108 
Furthermore, the court found the stockholders had assented to the 
unilateral adoption of binding bylaws and that they were on notice 
that the directors may take such action: “[T]he . . . stockholders have 
assented to a contractual framework established by the DGCL and the 
certificates of incorporation that explicitly recognizes that 
stockholders will be bound by bylaws adopted unilaterally by their 
boards. Under that clear contractual framework, the stockholders 
assent to not having to assent to board-adopted bylaws.”109 
Therefore, the court held that the forum selection bylaws were 
presumptively enforceable, like all other contractual forum selection 
clauses.110 After finding that the bylaws in question were facially 
enforceable under Delaware law, the court noted two options 
available to stockholders.111 First, stockholders still had the right to 
modify or repeal the bylaws.112 Second, stockholders could sue in 
their preferred forum and challenge the as-applied enforceability of 
the bylaws under the doctrines established in Bremen and Schnell.113 
The court concluded by addressing the as-applied enforceability of 
forum selection bylaws under the Bremen and Schnell doctrines.114 
The court explained that if stockholders filed in their preferred forum 
and provided sufficient proof that the forum selection bylaw was 
unreasonable under Bremen or was adopted for improper purposes 
under Schnell, then the other court could refuse to enforce the 
bylaw.115 The plaintiffs in Chevron, however, sued in the selected 
forum and only presented hypotheticals for why enforcement of the 
bylaws would be unreasonable.116 The court was not persuaded by 
these arguments, finding them more similar to a solicitation of 
advisory opinions than a legitimate as-applied challenge.117 As a 
 
108 Id. at 955. 
109 Id. at 956 (footnote omitted). The court explained that it reached a different 
conclusion than the court in Galaviz because the Galaviz decision rested “on a failure to 
appreciate the contractual framework established by the DGCL for Delaware corporations 
and their stockholders.” Id. 
110 Id. at 957. 
111 Id. at 958. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 959. 
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result, the court upheld the bylaws as enforceable provisions.118 In its 
closing remarks, the court reiterated that if the actual circumstances 
demonstrate that a bylaw “is operating in a situationally unreasonable 
or unlawful manner,” the enforceability of that bylaw might be 
successfully challenged.119 
B. The Aftermath 
While the stockholders initially appealed the Delaware Court of 
Chancery’s Chevron decision to the Delaware Supreme Court, they 
withdrew their appeal four months later.120 At the time, it was widely 
expected that the Delaware Supreme Court would affirm the 
decision.121 Less than three months after the withdrawal, the judge 
who presided over Chevron, then-Chancellor Leo E. Strine Jr., was 
nominated for Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court.122 He 
was confirmed unanimously by the end of January 2014.123 Chief 
Justice Strine has positively cited Chevron in a subsequent Delaware 
Supreme Court decision,124 solidifying Chevron’s status as stable 
precedent in Delaware. The stability of Chevron was reaffirmed and 
further strengthened in June 2015, when the Delaware General 
Assembly codified Chevron in DGCL section 115.125 DGCL section 
115 provides: 
The certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may require, 
consistent with applicable jurisdictional requirements, that any or 
all internal corporate claims shall be brought solely and exclusively 
in any or all of the courts in [Delaware], and no provision of the 
 
118 Id. at 963. 
119 Id. For the purposes of this Note, “as-applied” and “situationally” are used 
interchangeably. 
120 Theodore N. Mirvis, Surrender in the Forum Selection Bylaw Battle, HARV. L. SCH. 
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 28, 2013), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu 
/2013/10/28/surrender-in-the-forum-selection-bylaw-battle/. 
121 Id.; Anne M. Tucker, The Short Road Home to Delaware: Boilermakers Local 154 
Retirement Fund v. Chevron, 7 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 467, 467 (2014). 
122 Liz Hoffman, Leo Strine Nominated to Head Delaware Supreme Court, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 8, 2014, 7:34 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230434790457 
9308432948927494. 
123 Tom Hals, Leo Strine Confirmed as Chief Justice of Delaware’s Supreme Court, 
REUTERS (Del.), (Jan. 29, 2014 7:05 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/30 
/delaware-court-strine-idUSL2N 0L32MZ20140130. 
124 See United Technologies Corp. v. Treppel, 109 A.3d 553, 561 n.41 (Del. 2014). 
125 See S.B. 75, § 5, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2015). 
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certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may prohibit bringing 
such claims in the courts of [Delaware].126 
As a result of the well-established validity and enforceability of 
forum selection bylaws under Delaware law, commentators have 
recommended corporations consider adopting these bylaws.127 A 
substantial number of Delaware corporations have done so post-
Chevron.128 However, while Delaware law may be settled on the 
enforceability of forum selection bylaws, the efficacy of the Chevron 
decision in promoting forum selection bylaw enforcement and 
limiting multi-forum intra-corporate litigation is constrained to the 
extent that “judges in states other than Delaware enforce such 
bylaws.”129 The TriQuint decision presents a clear example of this 
constraint. 
C. Other Courts’ Treatment of the Chevron Decision 
After the Chevron decision, all courts that have faced forum 
selection bylaw challenges, except TriQuint, have upheld the bylaws 
as enforceable,130 relying on the Chevron reasoning.131 The 
discussions of the Chevron reasoning in two 2014 decisions, Groen 
and North, are particularly instructive. 
In Groen, a California superior court considered unilaterally 
adopted forum selection bylaws that made Delaware the “sole and 
exclusive forum” for derivative lawsuits against the directors.132 The 
defendant-corporations relied primarily on the Chevron decision to 
support the enforceability of the bylaws, while the stockholders relied 
on the pre-Chevron precedent, Galaviz.133 Pursuant to the internal 
affairs doctrine, the court applied the Chevron court’s reasoning 
 
126 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2015). 
127 E.g., Mirvis, supra note 120. 
128 Glen T. Schleyer et al., California Superior Court Enforces Exclusive Forum Bylaw, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 12, 2014), http://corpgov 
.law.harvard.edu/2014/06/12/california-superior-court-enforces-exclusive-forum-bylaw/. 
129 Andrew J. Noreuil, Will Recent Delaware Court Decisions Curb Excessive M&A 
Litigation?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 18, 2013), 
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/09/18/will-recent-delaware-court-decisions-curb        
-excessive-ma-litigation/; see also Gattuso & Adams, supra note 11, at 3. 
130 See City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 242 n.54 
(Del. Ch. 2014); O’Bryan, supra note 17; Schleyer et al., supra note 128. 
131 E.g., Hemg Inc. v. Aspen Univ., No. 650457/13, 2013 WL 5958388, at *2–3 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Nov. 4, 2013); see also O’Bryan, supra note 17; Schleyer et al., supra note 128. 
132 Groen v. Safeway Inc., No. RG14716641, 2014 WL 3405752, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
May 14, 2014). 
133 Id. at *2. 
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regarding both Delaware’s statutory corporate framework and 
“contractual principles at play.”134 The court held that the bylaws 
were valid and facially enforceable after finding the stockholders had 
not provided sufficient evidence for an as-applied enforceability 
challenge.135 The stockholders failed to prove the unreasonableness 
of enforcing the forum selection bylaws in the situation at hand, and 
“[t]heir argument that the forum selection bylaws were adopted after 
wrongdoing had already occurred [was] not supported by the 
record.”136 Consequently, the court granted the corporations’ motion 
to dismiss.137 
Likewise, a United States district court upheld a forum selection 
bylaw the same year in North, again relying on the Chevron 
decision.138 The corporation’s directors added a forum selection 
bylaw three years after the plaintiff-stockholders had originally 
purchased the stock.139 After considering Galaviz and Chevron, the 
court determined that Chevron was the “most persuasive” authority 
for the bylaw at issue.140 The court found that the stockholders had 
“consented to the Delaware corporate framework by buying shares in 
a Delaware corporation and agreeing to the certificate of 
incorporation that allowed the board to unilaterally adopt bylaws.”141 
Therefore, the bylaw was facially enforceable.142 Upon consideration 
of the as-applied enforceability of the bylaw, the court concluded that 
the bylaw was not unreasonable “simply because it was adopted after 
the purported wrongdoing.”143 Rather, the court reasoned that a 
corporation may enact a reasonable and fair forum selection bylaw, 
even after alleged wrongdoing, for legitimate efficiency and 
consistency considerations.144 Furthermore, because the stockholders 
knew of the unilateral adoption provision in the certificate of 
 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 North v. McNamara, 47 F. Supp. 3d 635, 642, 647 (S.D. Ohio 2014). 
139 Id. at 639. 
140 Id. at 642. Further discussion of why the North court treated Chevron as persuasive 
authority, rather than binding authority under the internal affairs doctrine, is outside the 
scope of this Note. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 642–43. 
143 Id. at 644. 
144 Id. 
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incorporation, the court concluded that enforcement of the bylaw 
would be neither unreasonable nor unjust.145 
III 
THE TRIQUINT DECISION 
In 2014, an Oregon circuit court refused to enforce a unilaterally 
adopted forum selection bylaw after holding that the bylaw was 
unenforceable as-applied.146 This court was the first to refuse to 
enforce a forum selection bylaw post-Chevron, and it is the only court 
to have done so to date.147 
A. The Facts and Holding 
The case involved a group of stockholders who were unhappy with 
TriQuint’s board of directors.148 They believed TriQuint was 
undervalued because of the board’s underperformance.149 The 
stockholders publicly announced their plan to oust the directors and 
delivered a letter to the board on December 2, 2013, expressing the 
same intent.150 Soon thereafter, the directors began negotiating a 
merger with another corporation.151 At a board meeting on February 
22, 2014, the directors approved the merger and recommended it to 
their stockholders.152 At the same meeting, the directors unilaterally 
adopted a forum selection bylaw,153 designating Delaware, TriQuint’s 
state of incorporation, as the forum for resolution of all intra-
corporate claims.154 TriQuint publicly announced the merger 
agreement two days later.155 
Spurred by the merger agreement, the stockholders filed multiple 
lawsuits against the directors in two jurisdictions, Oregon156 and 
 
145 Id. 
146 Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., No. 1402-02441, 2014 WL 4147465, at *5 
(Or. Cir. Ct. Aug. 14, 2014). 
147 Frankel, supra note 2, at *1. 
148 TriQuint, 2014 WL 4147465, at *4. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at *5. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at *4. 
155 Id. at *5. 
156 Id. The Oregon suits were filed on February 28, 2014, and March 13, 2014. Id. All 
references to the TriQuint decision in this Note refer to the first suit filed in Oregon, unless 
otherwise designated. 
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Delaware.157 The allegations focused on two facets of the merger: the 
appointment of TriQuint’s current directors to the new corporation’s 
board of directors upon consummation of the merger and the 
stockholders’ relative power over the new corporation through a 
“merger of equals.”158 The stockholders alleged “that the proposed 
agreement was an effort by the board of directors to keep their 
lucrative positions as board members, and presumably shield 
themselves from ouster by diluting original stockholder voting 
power.”159 In response to the claims, TriQuint filed several motions 
in the Oregon circuit court, including a motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.160 
TriQuint’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
was based on the forum selection bylaw passed during the February 
2014 board meeting.161 Because the bylaw obligated the parties to 
litigate in a different forum, TriQuint argued, Oregon courts did not 
have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the stockholders’ claims.162 In 
response, the plaintiff-stockholders asserted that the forum selection 
bylaw was unenforceable because it violated Oregon contract law.163 
Therefore, according to the stockholders, the bylaw did not preclude 
the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the intra-corporate 
claim.164 The court chose to first address the enforceability of the 
forum selection bylaw because the court was not required to dismiss 
if the bylaw was unenforceable for any reason.165 After holding the 
bylaw was unenforceable, the court denied the corporation’s motion 
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.166 
B. The Reasoning 
The court began its analysis of the bylaw by considering Chevron’s 
discussion of the statutory validity and facial enforceability of forum 
 
157 Id. The Delaware suits were filed on March 5, 2014, March 7, 2014, and March 10, 
2014. Id. 
158 Id. at *4. The merger of equals resulted in a fifty percent decrease in TriQuint 
stockholders’ relative control. Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at *1. 
161 See id. at *1 n.1. 
162 See id. 
163 Id. at *1. 
164 See id. 
165 Id. at *1 n.1. 
166 Id. at *5. 
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selection bylaws.167 The TriQuint court applied Chevron’s reasoning, 
confirming that unilaterally adopted forum selection bylaws are valid 
under Delaware statutory corporate law and Delaware contract law.168 
However, the TriQuint court also emphasized the scope of the 
Chevron decision, focusing on the limitation of the decision to the 
validity and facial enforceability of forum selection bylaws: “Chevron 
addressed a factual scenario where, absent any other allegations of 
wrongdoing, the board of directors of a corporation unilaterally 
adopted a forum-selection bylaw . . . . This, on its own and as a matter 
of law, is insufficient to warrant a contract-formation problem under 
Delaware law.”169 The TriQuint court drew attention to Chevron’s 
discussion of the plaintiff-stockholders’ failure to provide sufficient 
facts for an as-applied challenge and to Chevron’s instruction that as-
applied challenges should be evaluated using the Bremen doctrine.170 
In evaluating the as-applied enforceability of the bylaw, the 
TriQuint court looked to Galaviz and Reeves to reinforce the 
applicability of the Bremen doctrine to as-applied enforceability 
challenges in Oregon courts.171 The court quoted Galaviz’s 
enunciation of the Bremen doctrine to show the Ninth Circuit’s 
persuasive use of the precedent.172 Furthermore, the court noted that 
under Reeves and other Oregon precedents, forum selection 
provisions are generally given effect under Oregon contract law, 
unless they are unfair or unreasonable.173 Because Oregon, unlike 
Delaware, “ha[d] not expressly adopted the Bremen doctrine,”174 the 
court pieced together the three prongs of Bremen175 by finding 
support for the first and second prong in the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws and support for the third prong in other persuasive 
 
167 See id. at *2. 
168 Id. at *2, *5. “As Chevron holds, there is nothing inherently wrong with unilaterally 
enacting forum selection bylaws.” Id. at *5. 
169 Id. at *2. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at *3. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. (citing Reeves v. Chem Indus. Co., 495 P.2d 729, 730 (Or. 1972)). 
174 Id. at *3 n.2 (italicization added). 
175 Under the Bremen doctrine, a forum selection clause is enforceable unless (1) 
“enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust,” (2) “the clause [is] invalid for such 
reasons as fraud or overreaching,” or (3) “enforcement would contravene a strong public 
policy of the forum in which the suit is brought.” Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 
U.S. 1, 15 (1972). For further discussion of Bremen, see supra Part I.B. 
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authority.176 The court then disposed of the first and second Bremen 
prongs, which were not at issue given the circumstances, focusing the 
remainder of its evaluation on the third prong.177 
The court struck down TriQuint’s forum selection bylaw after 
finding enforcement of the bylaw would violate Oregon’s public 
policy interests and, consequently, would violate the Bremen 
doctrine’s third prong.178 The court found that, while Oregon also 
statutorily affords corporate boards the right to unilaterally amend 
corporate bylaws,179 enforcement of the forum selection bylaw in 
question “would be unfair and unjust” and “would violate the public 
policy supporting contract formation.”180 The court based its 
assessment in part on a Delaware precedent, Schnell, which the 
TriQuint court found to be “quite informative.”181 
According to the TriQuint court, “Schnell suggests that if it is 
alleged that a board of directors is attempting to infringe upon the 
[stockholder’s] right to amend or repeal unilaterally enacted bylaws, 
then that same action infringes upon the public policy of both Oregon 
and Delaware.”182 The timing of the bylaw adoption was critical for 
the court’s analysis: “Enforcement of the bylaw would not be an issue 
had the board, at the very least, adopted it prior to any of its alleged 
wrongdoing, and with ample time for the [stockholders] to accept or 
reject the change.”183 Therefore, without time for the stockholders to 
amend or repeal the bylaw, enforcement would be contrary to “the 
flexible nature . . . a Delaware [stockholder] contract necessarily 
allows.”184 Consequently, the court held that the forum selection 
bylaw was unenforceable as-applied and denied TriQuint’s motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.185 
 
176 TriQuint, 2014 WL 4147465, at *3. The persuasive authorities cited to support the 
Bremen doctrine’s third prong were Murphy v. Schneider National, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133 
(9th Cir. 2003) and Colonial Leasing Co. of New England, Inc. v. Best, 552 F. Supp. 605 
(D. Or. 1982). Id. 
177 Id. at *4. 
178 Id. at *5. 
179 Id. at *4. 
180 Id. at *5. 
181 Id. at *4. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at *5. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
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C. The Aftermath 
After the circuit court’s decision, TriQuint petitioned the Oregon 
Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus compelling enforcement of 
the forum selection bylaw; the supreme court allowed consideration 
of the writ.186 The parties submitted opening and answering briefs in 
January and February 2015,187 the Oregon Trial Lawyers Association 
submitted an amicus curiae brief opposing the writ in March 2015,188 
and oral argument was held on June 16, 2015.189 As of the date of 
submission of this Note to the editors of Oregon Law Review, the 
Oregon Supreme Court had not yet rendered a decision on the writ.190 
IV 
CRITIQUE OF THE TRIQUINT DECISION 
TriQuint was incorrectly decided. The circuit court misapplied the 
relevant forum selection bylaw precedents when it refused to enforce 
TriQuint’s bylaw. The circuit court also should have enforced 
TriQuint’s forum selection bylaw for public policy reasons. 
Therefore, the Oregon Supreme Court should grant TriQuint’s writ of 
mandamus, reversing the circuit court’s decision. Further, other 
jurisdictions should disregard the circuit court’s TriQuint decision 
when evaluating forum selection bylaws. 
A. Precedent Supports Forum Selection Bylaw Enforcement 
The circuit court in TriQuint misapplied Chevron and related 
precedents. Comparing TriQuint’s reasoning to that of other courts’ 
forum selection bylaw cases illuminates the TriQuint court’s 
departures. Oregon contract law provides a possible explanation for 
the TriQuint reasoning. 
One notable difference between TriQuint and other forum selection 
bylaw cases is TriQuint’s treatment of Galaviz. The Groen and 
 
186 Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., 356 Or. 576 (2014) (No. S062642) 
(disposition on mandamus proceedings). 
187 Defendant-Relators’ Opening Brief on the Merits & Appendix, Roberts v. TriQuint 
Semiconductor, Inc., No. S062642 (Or. filed Jan. 14, 2015); Plaintiffs-Adverse Parties’ 
Answering Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Roberts v. TriQuint 
Semiconductor, Inc., No. S062642 (Or. filed Feb. 11, 2015). 
188 Oregon Trial Lawyers Association’s and Public Justice’s Amici Curiae Brief on the 
Merits, Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., No. S062642 (Or. filed Mar. 4, 2015). 
189 Supreme Court Calendar, OR. JUDICIAL DEP’T, http://www.ojd.state.or.us/sclist 
(last visited May 25, 2015). 
190 This Note was submitted to the editors of Oregon Law Review on June 30, 2015. 
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TriQuint courts took different positions on the continued value of 
Galaviz.191 Groen included only a short mention of Galaviz, 
dismissing its applicability and importance to the case at hand: 
“Plaintiffs rely primarily on Galaviz v. Berg, a case that was decided 
before [Chevron] and that involved forum selection bylaws that were 
adopted after the majority of alleged wrongdoing had already 
occurred.”192 In this statement, the Groen court signals the 
inapplicability of Galaviz post-Chevron. In contrast, the TriQuint 
court treated Galaviz as good precedent, only limiting its applicability 
because Galaviz was decided solely on contract principles, without 
consideration of Delaware corporate law.193 This difference, while 
subtle, is telling in the greater context. Because Galaviz is the only 
precedent where a forum selection bylaw has been found to be 
unenforceable other than TriQuint,194 it provides some support for the 
outcome reached in TriQuint. Without Galaviz, TriQuint is the sole 
outlier where other courts have unanimously enforced forum selection 
bylaws. 
Another area where TriQuint departed from other decisions is the 
role of timing. In both TriQuint and North, the courts addressed 
forum selection bylaws passed after the alleged wrongdoing.195 The 
TriQuint court weighed the timing of bylaw adoption heavily in its 
evaluation because the close temporal proximity of the bylaw 
adoption and the alleged wrongdoing disrupted “the flexible nature of 
a Delaware [stockholder] contract.”196 Further, enforcement of such a 
term “would allow a potential defendant anticipating imminent 
litigation to . . . unilaterally, restrict the plaintiff’s choice of 
forum.”197 In contrast, the North court held that a forum selection 
bylaw “does not become unenforceable simply because it was 
adopted after the purported wrongdoing.”198 Rather, the North court 
 
191 Groen v. Safeway Inc., No. RG14716641, 2014 WL 3405752, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
May 14, 2014); Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., No. 1402-02441, 2014 WL 
4147465, at *1, *3 (Or. Cir. Ct. Aug. 14, 2014). 
192 Groen, 2014 WL 3405752, at *2 (internal citation omitted). 
193 See TriQuint, 2014 WL 4147465, at *1. 
194 See City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 242 n.54 
(Del. Ch. 2014). 
195 North v. McNamara, 47 F. Supp. 3d 635, 644 (S.D. Ohio 2014); TriQuint, 2014 WL 
4147465, at *5. 
196 TriQuint, 2014 WL 4147465, at *5. 
197 Id. 
198 North, 47 F. Supp. 3d at 644. 
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offered numerous legitimate reasons for adopting a forum selection 
bylaw concurrent with or after the alleged misconduct: 
[A] corporation may enact a forum-selection bylaw . . . for the 
purpose of consolidating litigation . . . into a single forum to reduce 
costs and prevent duplication. Not only would such consolidation be 
in the interests of the corporation, it also would be in the interests of 
[stockholders] to have the issues resolved efficiently and 
consistently.199 
The comparison of these decisions highlights the TriQuint court’s 
focus on the opportunity of the stockholders to repeal the bylaw, 
rather than the motivation behind the bylaw adoption, in its as-applied 
enforceability evaluation.200 
The TriQuint court’s focus on the stockholders’ opportunity to 
repeal speaks to one of the main issues where the TriQuint court 
diverged from the majority of courts: mutual assent. The court found 
that the close timing between the board’s adoption of the bylaw and 
the alleged wrongdoing denied the stockholders an opportunity to 
repeal the bylaw and violated Oregon’s public policy in favor of 
mutual assent in contract formation.201 A likely source of this 
emphasis on mutual assent is Oregon’s strong presumption that take-
it-or-leave-it provisions are unfair and unreasonable.202 However, this 
interpretation is contrary to Delaware’s interpretation of the mutual 
assent involved in Delaware stockholder contracts.203 Under 
Delaware law, the stockholders assent to the terms of the certificate of 
incorporation, which authorize the directors to unilaterally adopt 
forum selection bylaws.204 An inherent risk a stockholder accepts 
when forming that contract is that the directors will unilaterally adopt 
bylaws at inopportune or inconvenient times. This timing makes the 
bylaw unenforceable only if it is sufficiently egregious to render 
enforcement of the bylaw unreasonable or unjust, not solely because 
of when it occurred.205 
 
199 Id. 
200 See TriQuint, 2014 WL 4147465, at *5. 
201 Id. 
202 See, e.g., Reeves v. Chem Indus. Co., 495 P.2d 729, 732 (Or. 1972). 
203 City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 242 n.54 (Del. 
Ch. 2014) (“[T]he Galaviz and TriQuint decisions, to the extent they purport to apply 
Delaware law, are based on a misapprehension of Delaware law regarding the facial 
validity and as-applied analysis of forum selection bylaws.”). 
204 Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 956 (Del. Ch. 
2013); see also North, 47 F. Supp. 3d at 642. 
205 See North, 47 F. Supp. 3d at 644. 
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Additionally, the TriQuint court’s use of precedents in its as-
applied enforceability evaluation and its finding that enforcement 
would violate Oregon public policy are in conflict with the internal 
affairs doctrine. While the TriQuint court appeared to have accepted 
the validity and facial enforceability of the bylaw pursuant to DGCL 
section 109 and Chevron, the court relied on Ninth Circuit and 
Oregon precedents in part of its as-applied evaluation.206 However, 
under the internal affairs doctrine, Delaware law is the applicable law 
for the as-applied challenge.207 Only one Delaware precedent, 
Schnell, was cited in TriQuint’s as-applied evaluation,208 and it is 
unclear whether the TriQuint court treated Schnell as binding 
authority or as merely persuasive authority. Furthermore, the court’s 
conclusion that enforcement would violate Oregon’s public policy 
interest in contract formation209 is at odds with the court’s earlier 
application of Chevron in its facial enforceability finding. If 
unilaterally adopted forum selection bylaws are valid and facially 
enforceable under DGCL section 109 and Chevron, then enforcement 
of the bylaws should not violate a public policy interest in favor of 
contract formation absent other evidence of unreasonableness or 
wrongdoing. The TriQuint court inserts Oregon contract law into its 
as-applied enforceability evaluation where, under the internal affairs 
doctrine, contrary Delaware law is binding. 
B. Policy Considerations Support Forum Selection Bylaw 
Enforcement 
TriQuint’s forum selection bylaw also should have been enforced 
because of public policy considerations. Forum selection bylaws 
serve the values of consistency across judgments, efficiency in 
litigation, and use of the judicial expertise provided by the courts of 
the state of incorporation. While some policy considerations weigh 
against enforcement, such as stockholders’ rights to select the forum 
and the potential for abusive behavior by the directors, the policy 
considerations ultimately favor enforcement because stockholders are 
harmed by duplicative lawsuits and must absorb the costs of 
expensive multi-forum litigation. 
 
206 See TriQuint, 2014 WL 4147465, at *3. 
207 See supra Part I.D for discussion of the internal affairs doctrine. 
208 See TriQuint, 2014 WL 4147465, at *4. 
209 Id. at *5. 
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Enforcing forum selection bylaws enhances consistency in 
resolution of intra-corporate disputes. Multi-forum litigation has 
increased the risk that corporations will be subject to multiple, 
potentially inconsistent, judgments from different courts.210 One of 
the main benefits of forum selection bylaws is they eliminate this risk 
by providing corporations with a basis to move to dismiss actions in 
alternative fora, consolidating litigation in the selected forum.211 
Consolidation allows identical or similar claims to be reviewed by the 
same court, resulting in greater consistency in the resolution of claims 
and in the outcomes for plaintiff-stockholders.212 
Forum selection bylaws also increase efficiency in litigating intra-
corporate disputes. Adjudicating identical or similar claims in 
multiple jurisdictions is costly, and those costs are ultimately borne 
by the stockholders.213 Consolidating claims in the selected forum 
allows for efficient litigation, resolving all identical or similar claims 
arising out of the same facts at the same time.214 Furthermore, the 
forum selected in many bylaws, Delaware,215 resolves intra-corporate 
disputes based on the DGCL and Delaware precedents more 
efficiently.216 Refusal to enforce a forum selection bylaw in one court 
decreases the efficiency gains from enforcement in other courts 
because the enforceability of these bylaws becomes less settled, 
resulting in continued litigation expenditures to determine 
enforceability.217 Therefore, consistent enforcement across 
jurisdictions is necessary to reap the full efficiency benefits of forum 
selection bylaws. 
Finally, forum selection bylaws leverage the judicial expertise 
available in resolving intra-corporate disputes, particularly in 
Delaware. Pursuant to the internal affairs doctrine, the law of the state 
 
210 Victor I. Lewkow, Should Your Company Adopt a Forum Selection Bylaw?, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 2, 2013), http://corpgov.law.harvard 
.edu/2013/07/02/should-your-company-adopt-a-forum-selection-bylaw/. 
211 Thomas, supra note 12, at 1951; Lewkow, supra note 210. 
212 Thomas, supra note 12, at 1951. 
213 Daines & Koumrian, supra note 19. 
214 See Richard J. Sandler, Exclusive Forum Provisions: Is Now the Time to Act?, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 7, 2013), http://corpgov.law 
.harvard.edu/2013/11/07/exclusive-forum-provisions-is-now-the-time-to-act/. 
215 Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 1, at 326. Because many corporations choose to 
incorporate in Delaware and because the forum selected in most bylaws is the state of 
incorporation, Part IV.B assumes Delaware will be the selected forum. 
216 See id. at 354. 
217 Id. at 358–59. 
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of incorporation governs intra-corporate disputes.218 For Delaware 
corporations, Delaware chancellors have significant expertise in 
interpreting the DGCL and resolving corporate governance issues.219 
Leveraging the chancellors’ expertise in evaluating intra-corporate 
disputes leads to greater predictability in the application of Delaware 
corporate law.220 In contrast, when other jurisdictions, inexpert in 
Delaware law, attempt to interpret and apply Delaware precedents, 
they are more likely to misapply the law and render erroneous 
decisions.221 Further, hearing intra-corporate disputes in Delaware 
allows Delaware courts the opportunity to “advance and refine legal 
principles that govern the affairs of corporations and stockholders of 
Delaware companies.”222 This advantage does not arise when non-
Delaware courts adjudicate these disputes because non-Delaware 
precedents do not bind Delaware courts. 
Some policy considerations also weigh against enforcing forum 
selection bylaws. One such consideration is stockholders’ rights. A 
common critique of forum selection bylaws is they infringe upon 
stockholders’ rights,223 preventing them from choosing the forum.224 
This restriction inhibits the “value in letting plaintiffs bring suit 
against defendants in jurisdictions with which they have significant 
contacts.”225 While it is true that forum selection bylaws do curtail 
stockholders’ rights to choose the forum, stockholders agreed to this 
restriction when they purchased stock in a corporation whose 
certificate of incorporation grants the directors the power to 
unilaterally adopt bylaws.226 Additionally, stockholders have not lost 
the right to bring the claim itself: forum selection bylaws do not 
prevent stockholders from choosing the type of claim or from 
bringing claims altogether.227 Rather, forum selection bylaws simply 
 
218 Thomas, supra note 12, at 1926. 
219 See Grundfest & Savelle, supra note 1, at 354 n.137. 
220 Thomas, supra note 12, at 1951; Sandler, supra note 214. 
221 See City of Providence v. First Citizens BancShares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229, 242 n.54 
(Del. Ch. 2014). 
222 Mirvis, supra note 120. 
223 Claudia H. Allen, Delaware Corporations Seek to Counter Forum Shopping, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 14, 2012), http://corpgov.law 
.harvard.edu/2012/02/14/delaware-corporations-seek-to-counter-forum-shopping/. 
224 Thomas, supra note 12, at 1953. 
225 Id. 
226 Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 956 (Del. Ch. 
2013). 
227 Id. at 960. 
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limit the adjudication of claims to a foreseeable forum, the state of 
incorporation.228 
Another policy consideration that weighs against enforcement of 
forum selection bylaws is the potential for abuse on the part of 
corporate directors. Enforcing these bylaws marks a considerable 
change in power over the choice of forum from the stockholders to 
the directors.229 This change in power, potentially increasing costs to 
stockholders when initiating the claim, may impact stockholders’ 
ability to bring suits against corporate directors for breach of fiduciary 
duty.230 General enforcement of bylaws, however, does not prevent a 
finding of as-applied unenforceability under the Bremen or Schnell 
doctrines,231 preserving the stockholders’ ability to bring suits. 
Nonetheless, such unenforceability determinations should be reserved 
for egregious circumstances where the diminished ability to bring 
suits is clear from the record. This was not the case for the plaintiff-
stockholders in TriQuint, who filed claims in Delaware within days of 
filing in Oregon.232 Overall, the totality of these policy considerations 
weighs in favor of enforcing forum selection bylaws. 
V 
IMPLICATIONS 
A. The Future of Forum Selection Bylaw Challenges in Oregon and 
Other Jurisdictions 
The full impact of the TriQuint decision will depend on the Oregon 
Supreme Court’s ruling on the writ of mandamus petition. If the court 
grants the writ petition, the effects of the circuit court’s decision will 
be mitigated. The only post-Chevron decision refusing to enforce a 
forum selection bylaw will be overturned and the previous unanimity 
across courts in enforcing bylaws will be restored. 
If the Oregon Supreme Court denies the writ petition, the TriQuint 
decision will decrease forum selection bylaw enforcement in Oregon 
and potentially in other jurisdictions as well. Based on the circuit 
court’s holding in TriQuint, forum selection bylaws appear less likely 
to be enforced in Oregon courts. If the Oregon Supreme Court denies 
 
228 See Thomas, supra note 12, at 1951. 
229 Id. at 1955. 
230 Id. at 1954–55. 
231 See supra Parts I.B and I.D. 
232 Roberts v. TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc., No. 1402-02441, 2014 WL 4147465, at *5 
(Or. Cir. Ct. Aug. 14, 2014). 
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the petition, the difference in Oregon courts’ treatment of these 
bylaws will be magnified and cemented. The TriQuint decision may 
also impact enforcement in the other jurisdictions that have not yet 
decided a forum selection bylaw challenge (“undecided 
jurisdictions”). Denial of the writ petition will provide undecided 
jurisdictions with post-Chevron persuasive authority against 
enforcement. Consequently, motions to dismiss pursuant to forum 
selection bylaws will be less likely to succeed in Oregon state courts 
and may be less likely to succeed in undecided jurisdictions. 
B. Strategies for Increasing Enforcement of Forum Selection Bylaws 
TriQuint’s full ramifications have yet to be seen. However, this 
decision has already decreased clarity on forum selection bylaw 
enforceability and has increased the risk of non-enforcement. Even if 
the Oregon Supreme Court grants the writ of mandamus petition to 
enforce TriQuint’s forum selection bylaw, an undecided jurisdiction 
may still find the circuit court’s discussion of forum selection bylaws 
persuasive. Therefore, corporations seeking to prevent multi-forum 
intra-corporate litigation through forum selection bylaws should 
consider two options to increase the likelihood of enforcement: (1) 
clear day bylaw adoption, and (2) anti-suit injunctions filed in 
Delaware upon denial of a motion to dismiss in a non-Delaware 
jurisdiction. 
1. Clear Day Forum Selection Bylaw Adoption 
If a corporation wants to limit the forum for intra-corporate 
disputes through a forum selection bylaw and has not yet adopted one, 
it should adopt the bylaw on a clear day.233 A clear day is a time 
before the corporation is engaged in activity that will likely lead to an 
intra-corporate lawsuit.234 Adoption on a clear day allows time for 
stockholders to be given notice and react accordingly before the 
bylaw impacts litigation stockholders may bring against the 
corporation. Consequently, if stockholders are provided time to 
 
233 Daniel E. Wolf, Advantages of Board Actions on a “Clear Day,” HARV. L. SCH. F. 
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 26, 2014), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu 
/2014/11/26/advantages-of-board-actions-on-a-clear-day/; see also Allen, supra note 223; 
Theodore N. Mirvis, The Battle Against Multiforum Stockholder Litigation, HARV. L. SCH. 
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 25, 2014), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu 
/2014/08/25/the-battle-against-multiforum-stockholder-litigation/. 
234 Wolf, supra note 233. 
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contest the bylaw and fail to do so, a court can more easily conclude 
that enforcement is reasonable and just. 
Recent court decisions have signaled that adoption on a clear day 
increases the likelihood a forum selection bylaw will be enforced.235 
The TriQuint decision supports this connection between clear day 
adoption and enforceability: “Enforcement of the bylaw would not be 
an issue had the board, at the very least, adopted it prior to any of its 
alleged wrongdoing, and with ample time for the [stockholders] to 
accept or reject the change.”236 Thus, the only court that refused to 
enforce a forum selection bylaw post-Chevron states that clear day 
adoption likely would have resulted in a different outcome. Therefore, 
if the opportunity has not yet passed, corporations interested in forum 
selection bylaws should adopt them early and on a clear day to 
increase the likelihood courts will enforce their bylaws. 
2. Anti-suit Injunction Upon Denial of a Motion to Dismiss 
If a corporation has already adopted a forum selection bylaw and 
did not do so on a clear day, filing a motion to dismiss should still be 
the primary course of action whenever a stockholder lawsuit is 
brought outside the selected forum. In Edgen Group Inc. v. Genoud, 
Vice Chancellor Laster discussed several actions a corporation can 
take to enforce a forum selection bylaw.237 First, a corporation can 
file a motion to dismiss in the forum in which the stockholders 
originally brought the claim.238 Additionally, a corporation can 
pursue an anti-suit injunction in the selected forum.239 Vice 
Chancellor Laster noted that the anti-suit injunction is the more 
aggressive option.240 He also interpreted then-Chancellor Strine’s 
Chevron opinion to have “contemplated . . . that the forum selection 
provision would be considered in the first instance by the other court  
. . . not through an anti-suit injunction in the contractually specified 
 
235 Id.; see also, e.g., Groen v. Safeway Inc., No. RG14716641, 2014 WL 3405752, at 
*2 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 14, 2014); TriQuint, 2014 WL 4147465, at *5. 
236 TriQuint, 2014 WL 4147465, at *5; see also Wolf, supra note 233. 
237 Transcript of Hearing for Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 8, at 36–37. 
238 Id. at 37. 
239 Id. The vice chancellor also discussed another possible action: a corporation could 
bring a breach of contract action against the stockholders in the selected forum for failure 
to sue in that forum, obtain a default judgment in the selected forum when the stockholders 
do not appear, and seek enforcement of that judgment in the other forum through res 
judicata. Id.; Tucker, supra note 121, at 478. Further discussion of this option is beyond 
the scope of this Note. 
240 Transcript of Hearing for Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 8, at 37. 
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court.”241 Therefore, an anti-suit injunction is unlikely to be 
successful unless the corporation has pursued less aggressive options, 
like a motion to dismiss in the other forum, and the other forum has 
made a determination on that motion.242 
Based on Edgen Group, corporations should first file a motion to 
dismiss in the forum selected by the stockholders, wait to see if the 
motion is denied, and then bring an anti-injunction suit in the selected 
forum.243 Without the initial step of filing a motion to dismiss, an 
anti-suit injunction attempt is unlikely to succeed. However, if a 
corporation’s motion to dismiss is denied, the corporation can pursue 
the enforcement of its forum selection bylaw through an anti-suit 
injunction in the selected forum.244 
CONCLUSION 
TriQuint was the first and only decision post-Chevron to hold a 
forum selection bylaw was unenforceable. Given the recent nature of 
this decision and the pending writ of mandamus petition before the 
Oregon Supreme Court, the full ramifications for future forum 
selection bylaw challenges in Oregon and undecided jurisdictions are 
yet to be seen. However, if the Oregon Supreme Court denies the writ 
petition, TriQuint provides support for courts to rely upon when 
declining to enforce forum selection bylaws. 
The Oregon Supreme Court should grant TriQuint’s writ of 
mandamus petition based on Chevron and related precedents. Further, 
courts should enforce forum selection clauses pursuant to public 
policy considerations of consistency, efficiency, and judicial 
expertise. To increase the likelihood that their forum selection bylaws 
will be enforced, corporations should adopt bylaws on clear days and 
should pursue anti-suit injunctions in the selected forum if their 
original motion to dismiss in the other forum is denied. 
  
 
241 Id. at 38–39. 
242 See id. at 46, 48. 
243 See Tucker, supra note 121, at 483. 
244 Id. (“In the event that foreign jurisdictions refuse to recognize the enforceability of 
forum selection provisions . . . an anti-suit injunction in Delaware would become a viable 
alternative.”). 
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